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Abstract The present study addresses the role of vision
for perception in determining the location of a target in far-
aiming. Participants (N = 12) slid a disk toward a distant
target embedded in illusory Judd Wgures. Additionally, in a
perception task, participants indicated when a moving
pointer reached the midpoint of the Judd Wgures. The num-
ber of hits, the number of misses to the left and to the right
of the target, the sliding error (in mm) and perceptual judg-
ment error (in mm) served as dependent variables. Results
showed an illusory bias in sliding, the magnitude of which
was comparable to the bias in the perception of target loca-
tion. The determination of target location in far-aiming is
thus based on relative metrics. We argue that vision for per-
ception sets the boundary constraints for action and that
within these constraints vision for action autonomously
controls movement execution, but alternative accounts are
discussed as well.
Keywords Ventral system · Dorsal system · Far-aiming · 
Judd-illusion
Introduction
Goodale and Milner’s (1992) proposal that the dorsal and
ventral systems can be distinguished by the functional
demands that they serve in action and perception, has expli-
cated a confusion of neurophysiological and behavioral
observations. Nevertheless, contributions to action by the
ventral system, if any, are not clearly understood (Glover
2004; Milner and Goodale 2008). Hence, rather than
addressing the distinction between vision for perception
and vision for action,1 we aimed to assess the role of vision
for perception in the course of action. To this end, we
investigated a far-aiming task that was modeled on a tradi-
tional Dutch sport called shuZe-boarding (‘sjoelen’), in
which players slide disks toward a distant target.
According to Milner and Goodale vision for perception
serves to obtain knowledge about the environment, using
information that speciWes objects and their properties in
relation to surrounding objects in relative metrics. They fur-
ther argued that vision for action supports movement con-
trol and relies on information that speciWes objects in
absolute metrics. Research using visual illusions has shown
that perception of object properties, such as size and loca-
tion, depends strongly on visual context, attesting to the use
of relative metrics. Movement control, in contrast, remains
relatively unaVected by visual context, suggesting that
absolute metrics are used (Agliotti et al. 1995; Ganel et al.
2008). The role of vision for perception, however, is not
conWned to perception. Milner and Goodale (2008) (van der
Kamp et al. 2008) argued that the perception or identiWca-
tion of action goals and the selection of an appropriate
action entail key contributions from vision for perception.
For example, van Doorn et al. (2007) (see also Crajé et al.
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2008) recently demonstrated that in picking up relatively
large objects the choice of either a one- or a two-handed
grasp is aVected by an illusion. The control of hand
aperture, however, remained unaVected. In short, vision for
perception and action appear to serve distinct yet comple-
mentary functions in action. Vision for perception sets the
boundary constraints for action, and within these con-
straints the movements are autonomously controlled by
vision for action (Milner and Goodale 2008).
The present study addresses the roles of vision for per-
ception and action in aiming toward a target. In particular,
we asked what type of information is used to determine the
location of a target. One conjecture is that target location is
speciWed relative to its context. That is, vision for percep-
tion determines the target location relative to adjacent
objects in the environment and sets this location as the
boundary constraint for action. Informed by vision for per-
ception, vision for action subsequently exploits (egocentric)
information that speciWes this target location in absolute
metrics to the actor (Gentilucci et al. 1996). Inaccurate aim-
ing would reXect errors in the initial determination of target
location by vision for perception. An alternative conjecture
is that vision for action independently (i.e., without engage-
ment of vision for perception) uses instantaneous informa-
tion pertaining to the target location in relation to the actor,
without taking the broader visual context into account. For
movement control, this may be more eYcient than relying
on ‘delayed’ target location information provided by vision
for perception (Westwood and Goodale 2003).
Unlike far-aiming, near-aiming, especially pointing, is
well-researched in this context. In the typical study, partici-
pants make pointing movements to the endpoints of a line
embedded in illusory surroundings, such as a Müller-Lyer
Wgure (e.g., Gentilucci et al. 1996). A recent review of the
extant literature on pointing revealed that under full-vision
conditions (i.e., with both the target and the hand in view)
endpoint accuracy is largely immune to illusory conWgura-
tions. Only when vision of the target is removed (particu-
larly before movement onset) does signiWcant movement
bias occur (Bruno et al. 2008). In full vision, however, aim-
ing reXects movement control that is based on target loca-
tion information that is coded egocentrically in absolute
metrics (e.g., the gap between hand position and target
location). This online control is attributed to vision for
action.
Importantly, in near-aiming, control of hand position is
possible until contact is made with the target. Hence, analy-
sis of only endpoint accuracy (as in Bruno et al.’s (2008)
review) leaves doubts about whether determination of tar-
get location engages vision for perception. It would be
more convincing to study pointing with no opportunity for
participants to view their hand, or the target, during move-
ment execution (Westwood and Goodale 2003). In visual
open-loop conditions, initial errors in perceived target loca-
tion cannot be annulled by online vision for action control
as the movement unfolds. Yet, these conditions still allow
propriocepsis to reduce pointing error. Moreover, Gentilucci
et al. (1996) reported that in full vision the Müller-Lyer
Wgure aVected the entire kinematics of the pointing move-
ment (although the precise scope of the bias is diYcult to
quantify). This observation led Gentilucci et al. (1996) to
speculate that initial aiming was based on information
comprising visual context.
Contrary to near-aiming, in far-aiming (e.g., sliding a
disk toward a distant target) movement control (both
visual and proprioceptive) is necessarily conWned to the
moment the object is released. Hence, the issue of the type
of information that (i.e., absolute or relative) is used to
determine target location may be more appropriately
resolved using far- rather than near-aiming tasks. Two
studies speak to this point, but provide ambiguous results.
Glover and Dixon (2004) had participants step and hop
from one end of a Müller-Lyer Wgure to the other end
under full vision. A small illusion eVect (<3%) was dis-
cerned, but its magnitude might have been reduced by the
moving body occluding the target, especially in the step-
ping task. More recently, van der Kamp and Masters
(2008) reported that throwing accuracy in handball is inXu-
enced by the goalkeeper’s posture. Notably, the goalkeeper
mimicked an amputated Müller-Lyer Wgure by raising the
arms skyward (i.e., outward Müller-Lyer Wgure), stretch-
ing them to the side (i.e., neutral Wgure) or pointing them
downward (i.e., inward Wgure). These goalkeeper postures
aVected the perceived size of the goalkeeper in accordance
with the Müller-Lyer illusion. Intriguingly, participants
threw the ball further from the goalkeeper when the arms
were raised skywards than when the arms were stretched to
the side. However, when the arms were pointing down-
ward, the ball was not thrown closer to the goalkeeper.
Although this might suggest a reliance on visual context, it
cannot be ruled out that the eVects of goalkeeper posture
on throwing accuracy are related to factors other than the
illusory size of the goalkeeper (e.g., the arms up goal-
keeper may look more aggressive).
To further investigate what type of information deWnes
the target location in far-aiming, we asked participants to
slide a disk over the exact midpoint of a line that was
embedded in a Judd Wgure. We assumed that inXuences of
visual context (i.e., the arrowheads) are indicative for the
use of relative metrics, pointing to contributions from
vision for perception rather than vision for action (Ganel
et al.  2008). We hypothesized that if there is a role for
vision for perception in far-aiming, then sliding accuracy
will be biased by the illusion.Exp Brain Res (2009) 197:199–204 201
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Method
Participants
Twelve right-handed undergraduates of the University of
Hong Kong (mean age 21.6 years, SD = 1.3) volunteered to
participate. They were treated in accordance with the local
institution’s ethical guidelines and gave written consent
prior to the experiment.
Material
Participants were seated in front of a table (1.52 m in length
and 1.37 m in width). Three visual targets were used, con-
sisting of black lines embedded in a Judd Wgure with the
arrowheads pointing to the right or to the left, or without
arrowheads. Commonly, the arrowheads aVect perception
of the midpoint of the line such that the perceived midpoint
is shifted to the right for arrowheads pointing to the left and
vice versa. The lines, which were printed on a sheet of
paper, measured 0.08 m in length and 0.02 m in width,
while the arrowheads were 0.02 m in length and had an
inclination of 45° to the line. The targets were placed in the
middle of the table or 0.02 m to the right or left of the mid-
dle, at a distance of 1.2 m from the front edge of the table,
where the participant was seated. A red block (0.01 £
0.01 £ 0.01 m) served as the target during practice trials.
A Chinese chequer disk (0.02 m in diameter and 0.01 m in
height) served as the projectile. Two pre-calibrated cameras
of a QualisysTM 3-D motion capture system recorded the
trajectory of the disk at 100 Hz. ReXective tape made the
disk visible. There were two reference markers at the edges
of the table aligned with the target.
Procedure and design
The participants performed an action and a perception task.
For the action task, the participants started with a series of
100 practice trials. They were instructed to aim the disk at
the red target block by making a sliding action. Participants
observed the experimenter produce the sliding action to
become acquainted with how to hold, move and release the
disk. After the practice trials, the participants were
instructed to propel the disk over the exact midpoint of the
target line that was presented on the table top (Fig. 1). They
made a total of 90 sliding actions to 3 diVerent target lines
(i.e., line without arrowheads (‘control’), line with Judd
Wgure arrowheads pointing to the left (‘Judd left’) and line
with arrowheads to the right (‘Judd right’)) at three posi-
tions (i.e., middle of the table and 0.02 m to the right or left,
from the middle). The 9 conditions were presented in
blocks of 10 trials, the order of which was randomized
across participants. The participants propelled the disks one
at a time and at their own pace. Short rest intervals were
provided between blocks.
For the perception task, the experimenter moved a
pointer slowly behind the line from the left to the right (and
vice versa in the other half of the trials). The participants
were told to say ‘stop’ when they perceived that the pointer
was at the exact midpoint of the line. Participants were
allowed to alter their estimate if they had second thoughts
about its correctness. The experimenter then marked the
estimated midpoint on the sheet. A fresh sheet was used for
each estimate. The same 9 conditions (i.e., same target lines
and positions) as in the action task were used. They were
presented in blocks with the order randomized across par-
ticipants. Each condition was presented 4 times, resulting in
36 trials. Finally, the order of the perception and action
tasks was counterbalanced between participants.
Data analysis
For the action task, the trajectory of the disk was used to
compute the location, where the disk crossed the target line.
Sliding error was deWned as the diVerence (in mm) between
this location and the midpoint of the line. If absolute sliding
error was smaller than 10 mm (i.e., the disk touched the
midpoint) a hit was scored, otherwise a miss to the left (i.e.,
error <¡10 mm) or to the right (i.e., error >+10 mm) was
scored. For the perception task, the judgment error was
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the experimental set-up (i.e., not to
scale). Depicted is a Judd left Wgure in the mid position202 Exp Brain Res (2009) 197:199–204
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deWned as the diVerence (in mm) between the estimated and
the actual midpoint. We submitted both the sliding error
and the perceptual judgment error to an ANOVA (Target:
control, Judd left and Judd right) with repeated measures.
The number of hits and the number of misses to the left and
right were examined using a MANOVA (Target: control,
Judd left and Judd right) with repeated measures. Post-hoc
comparisons were made using Tukey-HSD, and p
2  was
used as the measure of eVect size. Finally, the diVerence
between the Judd right and Judd left Wgures for the sliding
and perceptual judgment errors served as indicators for the
illusory bias in the action and perception tasks, respec-
tively. T tests were used to assess whether the bias diVered
from zero.
Results
For the action task, the participants generally aimed to the
left of the midpoint of the target line, but less so when it
was embedded in the Judd left Wgure (Table 1). The
ANOVA conWrmed that sliding error was signiWcantly
inXuenced by Target (F(2,22) = 4.07, p <0 . 0 5 ,  p
2 =0.27).
Post-hoc tests indicated diVerences in error between the
Judd left and Judd right Wgures and between the Judd left
and control Wgures, but not between the Judd right and con-
trol Wgures. Figure 2 presents the illusory bias for each indi-
vidual participant. Ten out of twelve participants showed a
bias, with a mean bias of 6.4 mm (SD = 9.0 mm) that sig-
niWcantly diVered from zero (t(11) = 2.46, p < 0.05).
Similar to sliding error, the MANOVA on the perfor-
mance measures revealed a signiWcant eVect of Target
(Wilks  = 0.54, F(6,40) = 2.37, p <0 . 0 5 ,   p
2 =0.26).  Sep-
arate ANOVAs indicated that the illusion did not aVect the
number of hits (F(2,22) = 1.86). The misses were signiW-
cantly aVected by the illusion. Participants missed more to
the left of the midpoint when aiming at the Judd right and
the control Wgures than when aiming at the Judd left Wgure
(F(2,22) = 5.54, p <0 . 0 5 ,  p
2 =0.34).  Conversely, partici-
pants missed more to the right when aiming at the Judd left
and control Wgures than when aiming at the Judd right
Wgure (F(2,22) = 4.00, p < 0.05, p
2 =0.27)  (Table 1).
For the perception task, the ANOVA indicated a signiW-
cant main eVect of Target (F(2,22) = 94.5,  p < 0.001,
p
2 =0.90).  Post-hoc tests showed that the midpoint esti-
mates for each of the Wgures diVered. The average illusory
bias was 4.3 mm (SD = 1.3), which signiWcantly diVered
from zero (t(11) = 11.7, p < 0.001). Finally, a comparison
of the magnitudes of the illusory bias in the perception and
action tasks did not reveal a signiWcant diVerence
(F(1,11) = 0.64). A Pearson-product correlation, however,
failed to show a signiWcant relationship between the two
biases (r(12) = ¡0.24, p =0 . 4 8 ) . 2
Discussion
This study provided evidence of a contribution to action by
vision for perception. Sliding accuracy toward the midpoint
of the distant target showed a signiWcant illusory bias.3 The
determination of target location thus strongly depended on
information that speciWes the midpoint in relation to its
visual surrounding (i.e., arrowheads) in relative metrics,
Table 1 Mean (SD) for sliding error (mm), number of hits, misses to
left and right, and estimate error (mm)
Judd left Control Judd right
Sliding error ¡6.1 (9.3) ¡12.5 (8.3) ¡12.6 (3.9)
Hits 6.9 (2.6) 5.1 (3.1) 6.3 (2.4)
Miss to left 13.0 (3.3) 15.3 (2.9) 15.9 (1.4)
Miss to right 10.0 (2.7) 9.7 (2.7) 7.7 (2.3)
Estimate error 2.0 (1.1) ¡0.3 (1.0) ¡2.3 (0.6)
2 Exclusion of the two participants with a negative illusory bias in
action still resulted in a nonsigniWcant correlation (r(10) = 0.41,
p =0 . 1 2 ) .
3 In fact, only the Judd left Wgure diVered signiWcantly from the control
Wgure. Perusal of the literature shows that this observation is not
uncommon (e.g., Fleming and Behrmann 1998), but we found no
explanation for this asymmetry.
Fig. 2 The illusory bias in aiming for each individual participant.
A bias occurred in all but two participants (i.e., 1 & 9)
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indicating that vision for perception can indeed be engaged
in action. Prior work has already pointed to a role of vision
for perception in the choice of action goals and action
modes (for overview see Milner and Goodale 2008). The
present study further delineates this role of vision for per-
ception in action by suggesting that it also contributes to the
determination of target location. This does not imply that
the distinction between vision for perception and vision for
action becomes superXuous, nor does it prove that it is
correct (Smeets et al. 2002; Vishton et al. 1999). EVects of
visual context persist only when online movement control
is minimized or perturbed, such as in far-aiming or visual
open-loop conditions (Post and Welch 1996). In full-vision
conditions, errors in perceived target location are rapidly
reduced during movement execution by vision for action.
Ellis et al. (1999), for example, found that the location at
which a bar was grasped was not systemically distorted by
the Judd illusion (see also Gentilucci et al. 1996).
Vickers (1992) recorded gaze in participants performing
far-aiming tasks like golf putting and basketball shooting.
Information about the target, especially its exact location
was picked up prior to, rather than during movement execu-
tion. Vickers argued that the duration of the Wnal target
Wxation reXects the time needed for movement parameteri-
zation. She envisioned that target information stipulates the
parameterization of the pre-programed movement kinemat-
ics (see Glover 2004). In contrast, rather than prescribing
the movement kinematics, we argue that target location
information obtained by vision for perception acts as a
boundary constraint on vision for action. It is within these
boundary constraints that vision for action instantaneously
sets up and controls the kinematics of the movement in
real-time (Westwood and Goodale 2003). Admittedly,
however, we cannot distinguish the validity of these two
alternative accounts based on the present Wndings. Further
work is needed to determine how vision for perception and
action interact during the course of an action.
One critical factor that may inXuence the extent to which
vision for perception contributes to action is skill level
(Gonzalez et al. 2008; van der Kamp et al. 2003, 2008). An
important distinction between novice and skilled perform-
ers is the degree of conscious control of the action. It is
plausible that the more consciously an action is controlled,
the more likely it is that it engages vision for perception.
Gonzalez et al. (2008), for example, found that unfamiliar
awkward grips were much more susceptible to a size-con-
trast illusion than the precision grips that participants habit-
ually used to grasp small objects. The present participants
were all novices.4 Hence, the illusory bias might have been
markedly smaller, had the participants been skilled shuZe-
boarding players.
The illusory biases in the action and perception tasks
were not identical nor were they correlated, suggesting that
the tasks induced somewhat disparate contributions from
vision for perception. One possible distinction is that in the
action task the target location (i.e., midpoint of the line)
was visually available relative to the visual surroundings
only (i.e., endpoints of the line), while in the perception
task the moving pointer may have provided additional con-
textual information. Previously, Post and Welch (1996)
found that the illusionary bias in pointing to the midpoint of
a line within a Judd Wgure disappeared when a short line
was added to mark the midpoint. Yet, the moving pointer in
the present study does not necessarily provide more veridi-
cal information for the midpoint. Hence, it is unlikely that
this informational diVerence between the present tasks
caused a larger reliance on relative metrics in the action
than in the perception task. In any case, the present Wndings
do underline the role of vision for perception in action for
far-aiming tasks that are not uncommon. It is akin to direct-
ing a soccer penalty kick inside the uprights of the goal
rather than at the uprights or placing a tennis serve in the
back right corner of the service box rather than at the lines.
It remains to be seen whether the present Wndings general-
ize to targets that are visually more directly speciWed.
Another observation that suggests disparate contributions
from vision for perception in the two tasks is that partici-
pants slid the disk slightly to the left of the midpoint of the
line. A similar leftward bias is reported for adults in line
bisection tasks, where participants indicate the midpoint of
a line (McCourt and Garlinghouse 2000). Noticeably, this
leftward bias only presented itself during the far-aiming
task, but not when participants perceptually judged the
midpoint of the line. This diVerence might be related to
space being perceived diVerently within or beyond the
action space. Longo and Lourenco (2006) demonstrated
that the leftward bias in a line bisection task disappeared, or
shifted to the right, when the line is placed out of reach of
the observer. However, when the participant used a tool
(i.e., a stick), thereby expanding the action space, the left-
ward bias also occurred for larger distances. Similarly, slid-
ing a disk to a distant target might have expanded the
participants’ action space, resulting in a leftward bias in
aiming toward the target, but not when perceiving its
midpoint.
In summary, mapping the contribution of vision for
perception to action is conditional for understanding how
vision for perception and vision for action interact. In this
respect, we found an illusory bias when a projectile was
aimed toward a distant target, providing evidence for a
contribution to action by vision for perception. This
makes a great deal of sense given that determining target
4 This is suggested by the mean within-participant standard deviation
for the sliding error being much higher than for the perceptual judg-
ment error (i.e., 40.1 mm vs. 9.9 mm).204 Exp Brain Res (2009) 197:199–204
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location in far-aiming (e.g., inside the base-line) is tightly
linked with identifying action goals (e.g., hitting the ten-
nis ball down-the-line or cross-court) and selecting an
appropriate action mode (e.g., fore- or back-hand), both
of which involve vision for perception. Further investiga-
tion is needed to deWne how the two visual processes
interact.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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